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Abstract
We use intraday stock index return data from both sides of the At-
lantic during overlapping trading hours to analyze the dynamic inter-
actions between European and US stock markets. We are particularly
interested in differences of information transmission before, during,
and after the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. Our analysis draws
on the concept of Rényi transfer entropy to allow for a flexible and
model-free empirical assessment of linear as well as non-linear market
dependencies. Thereby the importance of extreme (tail) observations
of the return distributions is highlighted. The results show significant
bi-directional information transfer between the US and the European
markets with a dominant flow from the US market. During the crisis
dynamic interactions increase. At the same time information flows
from European markets increase. The US market does not entirely
regain its leading role in the after crisis period.
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1 Introduction
Several research papers have dealt with equity market linkages in recent
years. Bonfiglioli and Favero (2005), for instance, examine the long-term and
short-term interdependencies between the US and the German stock market.
They find evidence for contagion in the short-term dynamics, but no long-
term interdependencies. By contrast, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) document
no contagion, but interdependence in their analysis of stock market linkages
during the recent crisis. International equity markets and their interactions
are also the subject of a study by Bessler and Yang (2003) who support the
role of the US market as a leader among the world’s major stock markets.
We contribute to this vast and growing literature in various ways. First,
we use high frequency intraday stock index data and focus on trading times
when both European and US stock markets are open simultaneously. Sec-
ond, we use Rényi transfer entropy, a model-free methodology which allows
for great flexibility in measuring information flows. And third, we perform
an in-depth analysis of the financial crisis, tracking the varying strength of
information transmission before, during and after the financial crisis, broken
down to a monthly analysis.
A major characteristic of European and US stock markets is their par-
tially overlapping trading hours: When the stock market in New York opens
at 9.30 a.m. ET, markets in Europe have already been trading for 5 hours.
However, when those markets close (e.g. Frankfurt at 5 pm CET), trading
still continues in the USA. Information transmission during these overlap-
ping hours is in the focus of this article. The overlapping trading period
is particularly interesting as it is the only time where information can be
processed simultaneously. Information that is created before or after that
period can only be processed by the US or the European markets, respec-
tively, with delay. Considering the increasing availability of high frequency
intraday data, it is surprising that most studies are based on daily (Bessler
and Yang, 2003; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) or even monthly data (Bonfigli-
oli and Favero, 2005). Daily data are particularly difficult to analyze due to
the non-synchronicity of closing or opening prices. The analysis by Flad and
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Jung (2008) is one of the very few that uses high frequency data to study the
linkages of the US and the German stock markets during overlapping trading
hours. Based on the cointegration methodology, these authors find a distinct
leadership role of the DJIA in the price discovery process during the period
of simultaneous trading.
In contrast to the study of Flad and Jung (2008), we do not depend on
the existence of cointegration between stock market indices, whose economic
plausibility and empirical support have been questioned in recent studies
(compare Dimpfl, 2013). Instead, our analysis uses the concept of Rényi
transfer entropy, which is a flexible non-parametric method that accounts
for linear as well as non-linear dependencies (Schreiber, 2000). In particu-
lar, we do not need to rely on a specific (time series) model to estimate a
dependence measure like correlation, Granger causality, or Hasbrouck (1995)
information shares. The latter information measure is based on a microstruc-
ture model which allows for a direct interpretation of the common stochastic
trend as the efficient price and the derivation of information shares as con-
tributions to the variance of the efficient price innovations. This, however,
comes at the cost of a rather limited applicability: the time series have to
be cointegrated. Using Rényi transfer entropy instead, we exploit the em-
pirical distribution of the data using a completely model-free measure which
is based on information theory. The benefit is the unrestricted applicability
of this measure. However, we lose the direct microstructure interpretation
and, thus measure information flows rather than contributions to price dis-
covery. The link between the two measures is information: the innovations
in the microstructure model are generally interpreted as information flowing
into the efficient price while in the entropy context we measure an informa-
tion exchange between the two time series in the spirit of a general form of
Granger causality.
The concept of Rényi transfer entropy is similar to the more common
Shannon transfer entropy. Both measures are non-parametric and based
on the Kullback-Leibler distance between probability distributions. Rényi
transfer entropy, however, additionally allows to focus on specific parts of a
distribution, such as center or tail observations. When dealing with financial
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return data, which generally exhibit fat-tailed, non-normal empirical distri-
butions, this feature is of special interest. It allows us to focus on tail events
which are assumed to be more informative than observations located in the
center of the distribution. This is particularly true for high frequency returns
which are to a large extent extremely close to zero..
In spite of this appealing feature there are only few studies that measure
dependencies of financial time series by means of transfer entropy. Jizba et al.
(2012) use Rényi transfer entropy to quantify information flows between stock
indices. Marschinski and Kantz (2002) and Kwon and Yang (2008) apply
the Shannon transfer entropy in the same context. Dimpfl and Peter (2013)
analyze information transfer between credit derivative and bond markets
based on the Shannon transfer entropy as well.
From a methodological point of view, the study most closely related to
ours is the one of Jizba et al. (2012). While these authors use high frequency
data for only one and a half years, we examine a considerably longer data se-
ries which enables us to cover tranquil as well as crisis periods. Furthermore,
we also address statistical significance of the Rényi transfer entropy measure
based on the bootstrap method proposed by Dimpfl and Peter (2013).
Our results show significant bi-directional information flows at a one-
minute frequency between major European stock market indices (namely
DAX, CAC40 and FTSE) and the S&P 500 before the crisis. During the
crisis period the strength of information transmission peaks. In the post-
crisis period the magnitude is reduced again, but it remains on a higher level
as compared to the pre-crisis period. In addition we show that information
flows measured by the Rényi transfer entropy are the higher the more the
tails of the distributions are accentuated. This supports the notion that tail
observations of the empirical return distribution are more informative than
observations in the center.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces transfer entropy in general
and the Rényi transfer entropy. Section 3 discusses institutional features and
describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5
concludes.
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2 Measuring Information Flows using Rényi
Transfer Entropy
In order to illustrate the concept of Rényi transfer entropy we start by in-
troducing the Shannon entropy. Shannon entropy is a general measure for
the uncertainty associated with draws from a specific probability distribu-
tion. Its most important application is found in the context of information
theory to quantify the information content of a message (compare Shannon,
1948). Consider a discrete random variable J with probability distribution
p(j), where j denotes possible outcomes or (in terms of information theory)
possible symbols of J . Hartley (1928) defines the amount of information that
is gained when observing one specific symbol j of p(j) by log2(1/p(j)). Due
to the base 2 logarithm, the measurement units are bits.





It is a measure for uncertainty that reaches its maximum for an equally
distributed variable (e.g. tossing a fair coin which has equal outcome proba-
bilities). Uncertainty and, thus, the Shannon entropy measure are the lower
the more the probabilities for observing a specific symbol differ from each
other (e.g. if the coin was not fair).
Shannon entropy itself is a univariate measure. It is extended to the bi-
variate case by the concept of mutual information. Mutual information is a
symmetric measure based on the Kullback-Leibler distance, a measure for the
difference between two probability distributions (see Kullback and Leibler,
1951). Mutual information accounts for any form of statistical dependency.
Assume that I and J are two discrete random variables with marginal prob-
ability distributions p(i) and p(j) and joint probability distribution pIJ(i, j).








where the summation runs over all possible values i and j. Mutual informa-
tion quantifies the reduction in uncertainty compared to the case where both
processes are independent. Independence implies that the joint distribution
is given by the product of the marginal distributions, pIJ(i, j) = p(i)p(j), in
which case mutual information would be zero. In other words, mutual in-
formation quantifies the usefulness of knowing one process when predicting
outcomes of the other process.
Quantifying information flows in a finance context, however, requires time
series properties and an asymmetric measure. Schreiber (2000) introduces
a dynamic structure to mutual information by considering transition prob-
abilities. Let I be a stationary Markov process of order k. The probability
to observe I at time t + 1 in state i conditional on the k previous obser-
vations is p(it+1|it, ..., it−k+1) = p(it+1|it, ..., it−k). For the bivariate case,
Schreiber (2000) proposes to measure information flow from process J to
process I by quantifying the deviation from the generalized Markov prop-
erty p(it+1|i
(k)
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From the formula in Equation (1) it is evident that transfer entropy is an
asymmetric measure. Equation (1) measures the information flow from pro-
cess J to process I. In other words, Shannon transfer entropy quantifies the
additional information about the future value of I that is gained by observing
past values of J , assuming that the history of I is known. The information
flow in the opposite direction, TI→J(l, k) can be calculated analogously.
As proposed by Jizba et al. (2012), transfer entropy can also be based on
Rényi entropy rather than Shannon entropy. Rényi entropy as introduced by
Rényi (1970) depends on a weighting parameter q which emphasizes different









with q > 0. It is easy to show that for q → 1 Rényi entropy converges
to the Shannon entropy. For 0 < q < 1, the more improbable events, i.e.
the tail events are more accentuated, while for q > 1 the more probable
(center) observations receive more weight. Thus, Rényi entropy allows a more
differentiated analysis, as depending on the parameter q different areas of a
distribution can be emphasized. This is of particular interest in the context
of financial data where special features of distributions, such as fat tails and
tail dependence play a crucial role (Longin and Solnik, 2001; Grammig and
Peter, 2013).




with q > 0 to normalize the























Again, RTJ→I(k, l) measures the information flow from process J to I. The
inverse direction RTI→J(l, k) is defined analogously.
In contrast to the Shannon transfer entropy, a measure RTJ→I(k, l) = 0
does not mean that the processes I and J are independent as the obtained
value of zero only holds for the particular value of q used for calculation.
Furthermore, Rényi transfer entropy can become negative. For the Shannon-
based measure an extra knowledge of past values of J can never increase
uncertainty for future values of I. The worst case is that it does not add
any information, i.e. does not lead to any uncertainty reduction, leaving the
measure unchanged. In case of the Rényi entropy based measure, however,
negative estimates can occur as past values of J might increase the proba-
bility of a future tail event of I. In other words, observing J might imply
greater exposure to risk of I than would have been expected by observing I
alone (cf the discussion in Jizba et al., 2012). It is generally assumed that
extreme (tail) events are more informative than the median observation (
see Rocco (2012) for an overview of extreme value theory and the literature
cited therein). This renders Rényi transfer entropy a most appealing tool to
analyze information flows between financial time series.
1For details on the escort distribution see Beck and Schögl (1993), ch. 9.
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3 Stock market data
In our analysis we use one minute index value observations of the S&P 500,
the DAX, the CAC40 and the FTSE index. The data are obtained from
Tick Data, Inc. The sample of the DAX and the S&P 500 covers the period
July 1, 2003 to April 30, 2010. For the FTSE and the CAC40, the sample
period is shorter, starting in July 2006 only. Returns are computed as first
differences of the index values in logarithms. Days on which at least one
market was closed are omitted from the sample.
The sample is restricted to the period where the US and the European
stock markets are both open for continuous trading. The New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE) opens at 9.30 am ET which corresponds to 3.30 pm CET and
2.30 pm BST. The European stock markets in consideration all close at the
same time: Deutsche Börse Frankfurt and Euronext Paris at 5.30 pm CET
and London Stock Exchange at 4.30 pm BST. Opening or closing auctions are
not considered. We thus generally have an overlap of 2 hours and 120 index
or 119 return observations per day. During the switch from daylight-saving
time to standard time and vice versa the overlap may extend to three hours.
For these days we will use all available 180 index observations to calculate
returns.
In Table 1 we present summary statistics of the return series during over-
lapping trading hours. The data exhibit the usual properties of return time
series, in particular skewness and excess kurtosis. As expected, skewness
is negative for the European stock indices. For the S&P 500, however, we
observe a positive and rather large skewness value. This result is due to the
restriction of the dataset to the first two hours in the morning trading at the
NYSE2.
For the definition of the crisis period we follow Bai and Collin-Dufresne
(2011) and the Bank of International Settlements report by Filardo et al.
(2010). They specify the period July 1, 2007 to September 30, 2009 as
the crisis period. What is labeled “Phase 1” in Filardo et al. (2010) is
15 days shorter, ending mid-September 2010. Our results are qualitatively
2For S&P 500 returns of the entire trading day skewness is also negative (-0.5716).
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Table 1: The table presents descriptive statistics for the S&P 500, DAX,
FTSE and CAC40 returns for the full sample period.
S&P 500 DAX FTSE CAC40
Min -0.0167 -0.0121 -0.088 -0.093
5% quantile -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.001
Mean 0 0 0 0
Median 0 0 0 0
95% quantile 0.0008 0.0009 0.0011 0.001
Max 0.0125 0.0096 0.0796 0.0887
standard deviation 0.0006 0.0006 0.0015 0.0013
skewness 5.063 -0.1594 -2.2415 -1.8197
kurtosis 908.13 17.51 720.74 852.40
robust to this alteration. Table 2 reports the number of observations and the
corresponding number of trading days for the full sample period as well as
the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods.
Table 2: The table presents the number of observations and the number of
trading days for the full sample and the split samples. The datasets are
composed of the S&P 500 and the respective European stock market index
in column 1.
Dataset number of full range before during after
DAX observations 208578 July 1, 2003 to 118474 71454 18650
days 1690 April 30, 2010 992 556 142
FTSE observations 117379 July 3, 2006 to 30234 69085 18060
days 949 April 30, 2010 247 559 143
CAC40 observations 116309 July 3, 2006 to 29874 68596 17839
days 941 April 30, 2010 244 555 142
In order to calculate Rényi transfer entropy we need to recode the sample.
We propose to use three bins and divide the return data along the 5% and
95% quantiles (denoted as qr[0.05] and q
r
[0.95], respectively) of the corresponding











A for rt ≤ q
r
[0.05]
B for qr[0.05] < rt < q
r
[0.95]




replaces each value in the observed return time series rt by a corresponding
symbol (A, B, C). The choice of the quantiles is motivated by the distribu-
tion of the data which is depicted in the density plots presented in Figure 1
which are generated using the Epanechnikov kernel. The bandwidth is chosen
according to the ’rule of thumb’ proposed by Silverman (1986). The graphs
compare the empirical distribution of the return data (solid line) to a normal
distribution with the same mean and standard deviation (dotted line; see
Table 1). As can be seen, all time series are peaked and exhibit heavy tails.
The choice of the quantiles used to recode the data balances two aspects.
First, moving further into the tails and thus dividing the data, for example,
along the 1% and 99% quantile, leads to a very thin occupation of the extreme
bins A and C. This may result in missing observations when counting the
conditional frequencies. On the other hand, it is undesirable to move further
to the center of the distribution (and divide the data, for example, along the
10% and 90% quantile) as this would dilute the information contained in the
extreme observations. Using a 5% quantile to identify (extreme) tail events
seems to be a general consensus in the literature (see also Bae et al., 2003).
To calculate the transfer entropy we set the block lengths to l = k = 5
in Equation (2). Lag length selection is based on the mutual information
criterion; for details refer to Dimpfl and Peter (2013). The estimation is
re-initialized every day, which ensures that the blocks do not contain returns
from two different trading days.
As we have a rather large sample, even when splitting it into the three sub-
periods, the small sample bias that is generally encountered when estimating
transfer entropies is not an issue in our application. Therefore, we do not
calculate effective transfer entropies as advocated by Jizba et al. (2012) when
we analyze the long samples. Only when we move on to the monthly analysis,
effective transfer entropies will be used. Tests for significance are based on a
bootstrap of the underlying Markov process under the null hypothesis that
the two time series are independent as proposed by Dimpfl and Peter (2013).
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4 Information flows between stock indices:
What happened during the crisis period
In order to shed light on the transatlantic information flows during over-
lapping trading hours, we will first present the estimation results based on
the full sample and the three sub-periods defined in Section 3 to obtain
an overview of the information transmission. Subsequently, we perform a
monthly analysis to get more insight into the time variability of the flows, in
particular during the period of the financial crisis.
Tables 3 to 5 present our estimation results together with p-values for
the full sample as well as the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. We
distinguish four different choices of the accentuating parameter q, namely
0.1, 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8. Table 3 shows the estimated Rényi transfer entropies
for the S&P 500 and the DAX. For the entire sample period, we observe
highly significant information transmission in both directions. The transmis-
sion strength (the order of magnitude of the estimates) in the full sample is
basically balanced, that means that no market clearly dominates. This result
holds for all choices of q.
The pre-crisis period shows a distinctively higher information flow from
the S&P 500 to the DAX than in the opposite direction. For example for q =
0.1, the Rényi transfer entropy estimate of the flow from the S&P 500 to the
DAX is 27% higher than the reverse flow from the DAX to the S&P 500. Even
though our pre-crisis sample is longer than that of Flad and Jung (2008),
our results are in line with their finding of US dominance in the information
flows. During the crisis period the picture is altered: First, the information
flow intensity increases considerably; the difference between pre-crisis and
crisis estimates is also statistically significant. For values of q lower than
0.5 the measures almost double in magnitude. For q = 0.8 the magnitude
increases even by factor 10. After the crisis the transmission strength returns
to its pre-crisis level, but the slight dominance of the S&P 500 is not restored.
Again, this change is statistically significant. It seems that the estimates for
the whole sample period are mainly driven by the crisis. The magnitude
of the information flows in both directions corresponds to the one observed
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Table 3: The table presents the Rényi transfer entropy estimates for the DAX/S&P 500 index pair for the weights
q given in column 1 using the full sample (columns 2-3) or the split samples (columns 4-9). p-values are based on a
bootstrap distribution and provided in parentheses. → indicates the direction of the information flow (from→to).
full sample before crisis crisis after crisis
q SP→DAX DAX→SP SP→DAX DAX→SP SP→DAX DAX→SP SP→DAX DAX→SP
0.1 1.006 1.037 0.653 0.513 1.052 1.064 0.625 0.632
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
0.2 0.936 0.973 0.603 0.493 0.996 1.009 0.606 0.618
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
0.5 0.619 0.667 0.319 0.265 0.764 0.778 0.457 0.469
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
0.8 0.193 0.213 0.048 0.030 0.413 0.429 0.189 0.190
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
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Table 4: The table presents the Rényi transfer entropy estimates for the CAC40/S&P 500 index pair for the weights
q given in column 1 using the full sample (columns 2-3) or the split samples (columns 4-9). p-values are based on a
bootstrap distribution and provided in parentheses. → indicates the direction of the information flow (from→to).
full sample before crisis crisis after crisis
q SP→CAC CAC→SP SP→CAC CAC→SP SP→CAC CAC→SP SP→CAC CAC→SP
0.1 1.012 1.027 0.361 0.336 1.025 1.038 0.486 0.436
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.007) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.002)
0.2 0.942 0.958 0.353 0.327 0.960 0.973 0.471 0.431
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
0.5 0.624 0.646 0.201 0.181 0.681 0.699 0.325 0.312
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
0.8 0.201 0.207 0.029 0.025 0.294 0.303 0.093 0.091
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
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Table 5: The table presents the Rényi transfer entropy estimates for the FTSE/S&P 500 index pair for the weights
q given in column 1 using the full sample (columns 2-3) or the split samples (columns 4-9). p-values are based on a
bootstrap distribution and provided in parentheses. → indicates the direction of the information flow (from→to).
full sample before crisis crisis after crisis
q SP→FTSE FTSE→SP SP→FTSE FTSE→SP SP→FTSE FTSE→SP SP→FTSE FTSE→SP
0.1 1.006 0.9969 0.292 0.347 1.011 1.006 0.459 0.471
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.165) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.001) (<0.001)
0.2 0.939 0.930 0.290 0.328 0.948 0.944 0.446 0.457
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.032) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
0.5 0.630 0.630 0.155 0.168 0.679 0.682 0.302 0.313
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
0.8 0.201 0.209 0.021 0.024 0.297 0.307 0.078 0.090
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
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during the crisis period.
The described patterns hold for the different values of q. Choosing
0 < q < 1 accentuates the dependencies in the tails between the two re-
turn distributions. As q goes to zero, the weight placed on the transition
probabilities of the tails increases. This results in increasing measures of the
Rényi transfer entropy when q is lowered from 0.8 to 0.1 as can be seen from
Table 3. This supports the notion that it is actually tail events rather than
observations in the center that matter when it comes to information transfer.
Using Rényi transfer entropy which enables us to emphasize different areas of
distributions therefore provides a more accurate measurement of information
flows.
Table 4 shows the Rényi transfer entropy estimates for S&P 500 and
CAC40. Again, all estimates are significant on the 1% significance level for
all considered values of q. The interpretation of the results is qualitatively
similar to the one of S&P 500 and DAX. We observe significant bidirectional
information flows that decrease as q approaches 1. The order of magnitude
for the full sample period is virtually identical to the one observed for the
DAX and S&P flows. Also, estimates using the whole sample period seem to
be driven by the crisis period, as the information transmission strengthens
during the crisis.
We find that during the period until June 2007 the dominance of the US
information flow is not as strong as for the DAX. During the crisis period
the strength of the information flows in both directions is virtually identical.
Furthermore, the post-crisis period is marked by a higher level of information
transmission than the pre-crisis period. We also find a slight dominance of
the US market, but the difference is not very pronounced.
Table 5 holds the estimates for S&P 500 and FTSE. Here, all but two
estimates are statistically significant on the 1% significance level. For the
FTSE we find the dominant direction to be the one to the US in the pre-
crisis period. When q = 0.1, the transmission channel from the S&P 500
to the FTSE is not even statistically significant. This changes during the
crisis where there is a marginally greater information flow from the USA to
the UK than vice versa. After September 2009 the information flow does
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not completely return to its pre-crisis level, but remains on a higher level
than before the crisis. Again, the information flows are now more equal than
before the crisis which suggests that a) the financial crisis strengthened the
informational links between the US and European indices and b) information
transmission has permanently increased.
We conduct a number of robustness checks in order to examine the sensi-
tivity of our results with respect to the sampling frequency and the quantiles
used for recoding the data. We first alter the sampling frequency for the
specification reported above using 2 and 5 minute returns. Subsequently, we
repeat the analysis with data sampled at all frequencies (1, 2 and 5 minutes)
using the 6th and 94th quantile, the 4th and 96th quantile and the 10th and
90th quantile for recoding the return data.3
For the lower sampling frequencies of 2 and 5 minutes we observe a
lower estimated strength of information flows. This is most probably due
to the high speed of information transmission. Sampling the data at 2 or
even 5 minute intervals disregards a large part of the information flow that
takes place within this interval. Furthermore, the number of daily avail-
able observations is greatly reduced (from 119 one-minute-observations to
23 five-minute-observations) which impacts on statistical significance of the
estimates.
The conclusions drawn from the entropy estimates are robust with re-
spect to small changes to the quantiles used for recoding the data (6th and
94th or the 4th and 96th quantile). For the 10th and 90th quantile, how-
ever, we generally observe smaller estimates, i.e. a lower level of information
transmission. Using the 10th and 90th quantile for recoding means that
we increase the number of tail observations, i.e. observations that have been
part of the center bin before now move into the tails and are classified as ”ex-
treme” observations. This obviously leads to an increased amount of noise in
the tails as possibly uninformative observations are classified as extreme (and
potentially informative) observations. The pattern across time, however, still
holds. We observe higher information flow during the crisis than before or
after. The information flow is generally weaker before the crisis where we
3Detailed results are available upon request.
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have a slightly larger flow from the US market to the European market for
CAC40 and FTSE. After the crisis, the flows are more equal.
We conclude from these additional analyses that generally our results are
robust with respect to the choice of the sampling frequency and the quantiles
used for recoding. In general, the additional estimations support the main
conclusions drawn in the empirical analysis. The effects when altering the
modeling parameters are as expected. A lower sampling frequency leads
to a slight decrease in the order of magnitude of the estimates and to less
precision. Enlarging the tail bins also leads to lower Rényi transfer entropy
estimates as the discriminatory power between informative tail events and
uninformative center events is reduced.
To provide a more detailed picture about the development of the infor-
mation flows, in particular during the crisis period, we calculate the Rényi
transfer entropy on a monthly basis. As the number of observations is reduced
significantly, we now report bias-adjusted estimates or effective Rényi trans-
fer entropies, calculated as in Marschinski and Kantz (2002). The results are
graphically displayed in Figures 2 (DAX), 3 (CAC40) and 4 (FTSE).
In general, the main finding that information flows increase during the
crisis period and then level off slightly, is confirmed by the monthly estimates
for all three market pairs. In the graphics, the yellow shaded area depicts
the crisis period as defined by Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011). As can be
seen, the RTE measures start to rise in early 2007. This corresponds to
the time when Bear Stearns got into trouble until finally the US housing
market crashed approximately mid-June 2007 which marks the beginning of
the crisis. The rise of the RTE measure then gets steeper in the beginning of
2008. January 2008 saw the “Black Monday” where, for example, the DAX
lost approximately 7.5%. This led to the US Federal Reserve Bank lowering
interest rates in two steps within a week by 125 base points. There is a small
peak in the RTE measures in March 2008 which coincides with the break
down of Bear Sterns. In September 2008 when Lehman Brothers collapsed
and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac went into government control (indicated
by the dashed vertical line), we observe a distinct jump in the RTE measure
for all quantiles. The jump is most pronounced for q = 0.8. For weights
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q = 0.1, 0.2, 0.5 the peak in September 2008 is really a peak, after which the
RTE returns to its previous level. Only for q = 0.8 the magnitude of the
RTE does not return immediately to its previous level. After the crisis, RTE
generally remains on an elevated level.
Before the financial crisis and even in the early crisis period we observe
that the information flow from the S&P 500 to the DAX or the CAC40 was
dominating. In Figures 2 and 3 the solid line lies clearly above the dashed
line until September 2008. For the FTSE, depicted in Figure 4, the difference
is negligible. Then, during the crisis period, the level of the information flow
from the US market matches the one to the US market. As major crisis
events happened on both sides of the Atlantic, this finding is not surprising.
However, in the after-crisis period, the information flows in both directions
are still similar for the FTSE and the DAX sample which suggests that
the US market has lost some of its importance during the crisis. Another
explanation could be the ongoing Euro crisis which generates information of
world wide importance in Europe and then translates into the US market.
For the CAC40 we observe that the US market retains its informational
leadership role the entire time. This becomes more evident from Figure 3
than from Table 4.
Overall, the analysis of information flows between European and US stock
markets reveals that before the financial crisis, the US market played a dom-
inant role: the information flow from the US to Europe was greater than the
one in the other direction. This is in line with findings of Flad and Jung
(2008). However, during the financial crisis the information flows became
more conform. The similar strength of the information flow is conserved
after the financial crisis for Germany and the UK. The French market, how-
ever, seems to be more susceptible to US information and the information
flow into France is greater than in the other direction.
5 Conclusion
We investigate the information flows between European and US stock mar-
kets during overlapping trading hours with a particular focus on the recent
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financial crisis period. We employ Rényi transfer entropy as it is a flexible
measure which captures asymmetries and non-linearity in the transmission
process.
Our results indicate that the flow of information across the Atlantic has
dramatically increased during the financial crisis. We find elevated levels of
the Rényi transfer entropy as soon as the crisis begins. After the crisis, the
information flow is slightly reduced, but remains at a higher level as com-
pared to the pre-crisis period. We find partial support for the dominating
role of the US market before the crisis. However, the interplay between the
US and the German and the US and the UK markets becomes more equal
during and after the financial crisis. Only for the French market the US lead-
ership is visible throughout the entire time we investigate. This means that
information processing today takes place simultaneously at the European and
the US stock exchanges and that in general, information flows between the
different markets are of similar strengths. The finding that the relationship is
not stable over time is in line with the literature which documents changing
co-movement and information transmission between stock markets (see inter
alia Brooks and Del Negro, 2004; Rua and Nunes, 2009).
Focusing on the crisis period in more detail reveals that information like
the collapse of Lehman Brothers has a serious impact on all markets as the
information flow increases dramatically. This shows that major events pro-
voke feedback effects and information cascades which may, as in the Lehman
case, lead to a significant downturn of the markets. In this respect our article
supports findings of contagion and spillovers between financial markets (see
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Figure 1: Return density plots. The figure presents density plots of S&P 500,
DAX, FTSE and CAC40 one minute returns for overlapping trading hours using the
Epanechnikov kernel (solid line). The dotted line is a normal distribution configured with
the mean and standard deviation of the respective return series (see Table 1).
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Figure 2: Monthly RTE of DAX and S&P 500. The figure displays monthly Rényi
transfer entropy estimates for DAX and S&P 500 for four different weighting values q. The
solid line presents the information flow from the S&P 500 to the DAX, the dashed line
presents the information flow from the DAX to the S&P 500. The dashed vertical line
depicts September 2008, the yellow shaded area highlights the crisis period as defined by
Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011).
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Figure 3: Monthly RTE of CAC40 and S&P 500. The figure displays monthly
Rényi transfer entropy estimates for CAC40 and S&P 500 for four different weighting
values q. The solid line presents the information flow from the S&P 500 to the CAC40,
the dashed line presents the information flow from the CAC40 to the S&P 500. The dashed
vertical line depicts September 2008, the yellow shaded area highlights the crisis period as
defined by Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011).
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Figure 4: Monthly RTE of FTSE and S&P 500. The figure displays monthly Rényi
transfer entropy estimates for FTSE and S&P 500 for four different weighting values q.
The solid line presents the information flow from the S&P 500 to the FTSE, the dashed
line presents the information flow from the FTSE to the S&P 500. The dashed vertical
line depicts September 2008, the yellow shaded area highlights the crisis period as defined
by Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011).
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